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Perlembagaan Iraq 2005 memberikan Mahkamah Agung Persekutuan (selepas ini 
dirujuk sebagai "FSC") kuasa bagi mengawal selia undang-undang dan pentafsiran 
mengenai Perlembagaan undang-undang. FSC merupakan mahkamah tertinggi dalam 
piramid kehakiman Iraq. Selain memiliki kuasa mengawal selia undang-undang dan 
mentafsir Perlembagaan, FSC juga boleh menentukan tindakan eksekutif adalah 
mengikut Perlembagaan. Tesis ini merangkumi pelbagai masalah seperti keputusan 
FSC yang muktamad dan sifat keputusan FSC yang mengikat iaitu isu di mana undang-
undang akan diguna pakai jika berlaku percanggahan antara undang-undang 
persekutuan dan wilayah, serta komposisi ahli FSC. Objektif utama tesis ini adalah 
untuk mengkaji keputusan FSC dalam menjalankan kuasanya bagi urusan mengawal 
selia undang-undang dan pentafsiran mengenai Perlembagaan berkaitan keputusannya 
yang muktamad dan sifatnya yang mengikat semua pihak berkuasa. Tesis ini 
menggunakan metodologi penyelidikan doktrin undang-undang dan empirikal; data 
dokumentari dikumpulkan melalui sumber perpustakaan termasuk undang-undang 
yang berkaitan, kes mahkamah dan sumber lain telah disokong oleh data utama yang 
dikumpulkan dari temubual dengan hakim FSC, peguam dan ahli akademik khusus 
dalam bidang undang-undang Perlembagaan. Tesis ini menyimpulkan bahawa kuasa 
FSC dari segi pengawal seliaan dan pentafsiran undang-undang mengenai 
Perlembagaan adalah secara praktisnya dilemahkan oleh Perlembagaan Iraq sendiri. 
Sebagai contoh Perkara 61 (6) dilihat seperti mempersoalkan keputusannya yang 
muktamad dan sifat keputusan FSC yang mengikat. Juga, Perkara 121 (2) dilihat juga 
berpihak kepada undang-undang wilayah sekiranya berlaku percanggahan dengan 
undang-undang persekutuan berkenaan dengan perkara di luar bidangkuasa eksklusif 
kerajaan persekutuan. Tesis ini mencadangkan supaya Perlembagaan Iraq 2005 perlu 
ditafsirkan secara meluas. Ia bukan undang-undang di mana tafsiran yang sempit perlu 
diterimapakai. FSC Iraq diharapkan supaya menentukan undang-undang, termasuk 
maksud Perlembagaan. 
Kata Kunci: Undang-undang Perlembagaan, Mahkamah Agung Persekutuan, Kawal 











The Iraqi Constitution 2005 gives the Federal Supreme Court (hereinafter referred to 
as “FSC”) the powers of legal supervision and interpretation on the constitutionality 
of laws. The FSC constitutes the apex court in the Iraqi judicial pyramid. Apart from 
having the powers of legal supervision and interpretation on the constitutionality of 
laws, the FSC equally determines the constitutionality of the executive actions. This 
thesis revolves around a wide range of problems such as the finality and binding nature 
of the decision of the FSC, the issue of which law is to prevail in case of a conflict 
between federal and regional law, and the composition of the members of the FSC. 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyse the decisions of the FSC in terms of 
exercising its powers of legal supervision and interpretation on the constitutionality of 
laws as to its finality and binding nature on all authorities. The thesis adopts a doctrinal 
legal and empirical research methodologies; documentary data were collected through 
a library based sources including relevant legislations, court cases and other resources 
were corroborated by primary data collected from interviews with judges of the FSC, 
lawyers and legal academics specialized in the area of constitutional law. The thesis 
concludes that the powers of the FSC in terms of legal supervision and interpretation 
on the constitutionality of laws are practically undermined by the Iraqi Constitution 
itself. Take for instance Article 61(6) seems to question the finality and binding nature 
of the decision of the FSC. Also, Article 121(2) appears to be in favour of a regional 
law in case there is a conflict with a federal law in respect to a matter outside the 
exclusive powers of the federal government. The thesis recommends that the Iraqi 
Constitution 2005 must be interpreted broadly. It is not a statute where a narrow 
interpretation may be justified. The Iraqi FSC is expected to determine the law, 
including the meaning of the Constitution. 
Keywords: Constitutionality of Laws, Federal Supreme Court, Legal Supervision, 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
Constitution of a country represent   sacred document from which all laws and actions 
derive their legitimacy. As a sacred document, it must be respected by all authorities 
or persons, in order to foster the spirit of constitutionalism. The Constitution separates 
the functions of law making, administration and interpretation of the laws between the 
three arms of government, namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 
While the law-making function is vested in the legislature or the parliament, the 
administration of the laws is the preserve of the executive. Legal supervision and 
interpretation on the constitutionality of laws is vested in the judiciary that comprise 
of the courts. It follows, therefore, that the three arms of government and all authorities 
must keep and act within the confines of the powers given to them by the Constitution.  
In all democracies, especially for countries with a written Constitution the Constitution 
is of crucial importance because it is superior to all laws and guides the operation of 
government. Being superior, the Constitution prevails over other laws. Thus, when 
ordinary laws conflict with the Constitution, the Constitution prevails, and the ordinary 
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1. Constitution of the United States (1789). 
2. Basic Law of Ottman 1876. 
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4. Constitution of Iraq 1958. 
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7. Constitution of Iraq 1968. 
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 IN- DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONAIRE: Interview Questions – English 
 
 
Dear Participant,   
My name is HIND ALI MOHAMMAD.  I am a PhD student at University Utara 
Malaysia. I am conducting research to examine the powers of the Federal Supreme 
Court in Iraq on legal supervision and interpretation on the constitutionality of laws 
under the Iraqi Constitution 2005. Your participation will help me in this study to 
gather important and relevant information related to the powers of the Federal Supreme 
Court in Iraq. All the responses will be treated in the strictest confidence and the data 
collected will be stored in anonymous form. The findings of this research will only be 
used for academic purpose only. All answers will be used only for scientific purposes 
and dealt with strictly confidential.  I appreciate your tight schedules and thank you in 
advance for taking your time. 
Time to look at and respond to this questionnaire.    






Section A: Demographic Information.  
Section B: Relates to the Composition and the extent of the powers of the Federal 
Supreme Court under the 2005 Iraqi Constitution 
Section C: Relates to the Working of Separation of Powers under the Iraqi 
Constitutional Law and issues of Judicial Independence 
Please, take your time to complete all questions as completely as possible. Your 
participation will be greatly appreciated.  
Sincerely,  
HIND ALI MOHAMMAD  
PhD student  
College of Law, (COLGIS) 
Universiti Utara Malaysia   
Supervisors:-  
DR. AHMAD MASUM                                                                                                          
DR. ROHANA BINTI ABDUL RAHMAN  











Section A: Demographic Data of the Interviewees (Judges of the FSC, Lawyers, 
University professors of constitutional law) 
(Please tick (√ ) in an appropriate box)    
1. Profession: (  ) Judge, (  ) Lawyer, (  ) professors of constitutional law. 
1. Gender:      (  ) Male (  ) Female.  
2. Age:           (  ) 20-30 (  ) 31-40 ( ) 41-50 (  ) 51-60 (  ) Above 60.  
3. Educational level: Bachelor’s degree (  ) Master’s Degree (  ) Doctoral Degree, (  )  
4. Marital Status: (  ) Single, (  ) Married, (  ) Divorced, (  ) Widow. 
5. Rank. 
(a) Professor. 
(b) Senior Lecturer. 
(c) Other. 
6.How long have you been in this Profession? 
       (  ) Less than 1 year. 
       (  ) 1-5 years. 
       (  ) 6-10 years. 
       (  ) 10-20 years. 
       (  ) More than 20 years.     
Section B: The decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in terms of exercising its 
powers of supremacy and constitutional interpretation on the constitutionality of 
laws are final and conclusive thus binding on all authorities? And are the Iraqi 
Federal Supreme Court modify the application of the federal law in the regions if 
there is a  conflict  between the Federal law and the regional law  on issues outside 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal authorities appointment, Composition, 




1. From your experience, what is your opinion about the decisions of the Iraqi 
Federal Supreme Court, are the decisions final and binding on all authorities 
and persons? How strong and independent do you see the Iraqi Federal 
Supreme Court in taking her decisions? (Probes are there interferences from 
the other arms of government? If there is executive interference in the 
decisions of the FSC how has the FSC handled such situations? 
2. How are powers shared between the federal and regional governments in Iraq? 
3. In your opinion, how appropriate is the provision allowing the application of 
regional law over federal law in case of conflict between regional law and 
federal law?  (Does this amount to regional paramountcy? Does this not 
amount to creating dual judicial authority in Iraq? 
Section c: 3. Should the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court comprising of experts 
in the area of Islamic Jurisprudence conferred with the power to the supervise 
the constitutionality of laws in supremacy and constitutional interpretation? 
And Should the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court comprising of not-elected judges 
conferred with the power to the supervise the constitutionality of laws in 
supremacy and constitutional interpretation? 
1.   What are the criteria adopted in the appointment of judges of the FSC under the 
2005 Iraqi Constitution? What are the considerations in the appointment? How 
different is the process under the 1925 Basic Law of Iraq? 
2.   In your opinion, why are members of parliament elected by the people of Iraq, 
while the judges of the FSC are not elected? And do you consider the fact that the 
judges of the Iraqi FSC being unelected, should not be allowed to determine the 




3.  What is your opinion on the composition of judges of the FSC of Iraq in terms of 
its inclusion of Islamic experts? What are the main reasons for the inclusion of 
Islamic experts among the judges? And how do you rate the expertise of the Islamic 
Judges in the appreciation of the rules of interpretation? (Are their decisions 
carrying equal weight with the decisions of other judges? 
4.   What is your opinion on the powers of the FSC asserting its “constitutional control” 
in the interpretation of the constitution? How has the FSC used its powers in 
determining the constitutionality of the actions of the other branches? 
 
5.   In your opinion to what extent do you think the powers of the FSC of legal 
supervision and interpretation assisted democracy and the protection of the Iraqi 
people?  (Has the FSC checked the domination of one level of government or 
community from the other?) 
6.   How do you see the working of separation of powers under the Iraqi 2005 
Constitution? (Probes: How has separation of powers shaped the working of the 
2005 Iraqi Constitution? And do you consider the powers of the FSC in the 
determination of the constitutionality of laws as a violation of the concept of 
separation of powers?  
7.  Do you consider the powers of the FSC in the determination of the constitutionality 
of laws as a violation of the concept of separation of powers?  
8.   Finally, is there anything you would like to add or comments you wish to make on  




APPENDIX III                                        
                                             Interview Questions – Arabic 
  االسئلة
 القسم ا/
 (البيانات الديموغرافية لمقابلة )القضاة والمحامين وأساتذة القانون(
( في المربع المناسب)√( يرجى وضع عالمة  ) 
( أساتذة القانون  ( محامي، )  ( قاضي، )  المهنة: )  
( أنثى   ( ذكر )  الجنس: ) .  
  60)( فوق  51-60)(  41-50)(  31-40)(  20-30(   العمر: ) .
( درجةالدكتوراه،  ( درجةالماجستير )  المستوى التعليمي: بكالوريوس ) . (  ) 
(.  ( مطلق، )  ( متزوج، )  الحالة الزوجية: اعزب، )  
 منذ متى وانت تعمل في هذه المهنة؟
(.  اقل من سنة )         
(.  سنة    ) 15  
(.  سنوات ) 10 -6        
(. سنة )  20 -10         
عاما 20أكثرمن  (  ) .  
ا في العراق. القسم ب/ تعيين وتاليف السلطات واستقالل المحكمة االتحادية العلي  
مه لجميع الشخاص 1 . هل تعتبر قرارات المحكمة التحادية العليا في العراق نهائية وملز
ا؟ هل  ؟ هل في رايكم المحكمة التحادية قوية ومستقلة في اتخاذ قراراته والسلطات في الدولة
حادية العليا هناك تدخالت من قب السلطة التشريعية والتنفيذية والحزاب في عمل المحكمة الت
او قضية معينه  دالة على تدخ السلطات في عمل  وفي اتخاذ قراراتها؟ ارجو اعطاء مثال




هي المعايير المتخذة في تعيين قضاة المحكمة التحادية العليا, برايك هل لدى قضاة 2 . ما 
؟ هل النقسام الطائفي له 2005العراقي المحكمة التحادية القدرة على تفسير احكام الدستور 
, عن القانون 2005تاثير على تعيين القضاة؟ كيف تختلف عملية تعيين القضاة في دستور 
؟1925االساسي العراقي لعام   
مة التحادية 3 . برايك لماذا اعضاء البرلمان منتخبين من قبل الشعب العراقي بينما قضاة المحك
العراقي ويسمح لهم القانون بتحديد دستورية القوانين التي تصدر غير منتخبين من قبل الشعب 
 من البرلمان العراقي هل هذا جائز برايك؟
هم 4 . برايك تاليف المحكمة االتحادية من )غير القضاة(  و
ون, ما هي االسباب التي ادت الى وجودهم؟ برايك هل  هالسالمي،وفقهاءالقان خبراءفيالفق
وهل تعتبر هذه القرارات التي يصدرها الخبراء والفقهاء مساوية يستطيع هوالء تفسير الدس تور؟ 
 الى قرارات  قضاة المحكمة التحادية العليا؟
. ما هو رايك حول صالحية المحكمة التحادية العليا في الرقابة والتفسير القانوني للقوانين ؟ 5
ذا كان هناك تجاوز من وكيف تستخدم المحكمة صالحياتها ضد السلطات االخرى في الدولة ا
 السلطات؟
ك هل تعتقد ان صالحية المحكمة التحادية في الرقابة وتفسير القواين تساعد في ارساء 6 . براي
؟ هل تكون المحكمة مهيمنة في بعض الحيان في  الديمقراطية  وتحمي حقوق الشعب العراقي
ومه؟  عملها ضد السلطات او الحك
.2005لسلطات بموجب الدستور العراقي الفرع ب/ العمل في الفصل بين ا  
؟ كيف يتم تقاسم 2005. كيف ترى العمل في الفصل بين السلطات بموجب الدستور العراقي 7
 الفصل بين السلطات في الدستور؟
مة التحادية العليا في الرقابة والتفسير مخالفة لمبدا الفصل بين 8 . هل عتبر سلطات المحك
ها في مبدا الفصل بين السلطات في العراق؟السلطات في العراق؟ ما هي  العيوب التي ترا  
؟ هل تعتبر 9 . كيف يتم التقاسم في السلطات بين الحكومة الفيدرالية وحكومة القليم في العراق




هو مناسب في الحكم10 ك هل  الذي يسمح بتطبيق القانون القليمي على القانون  .  في راي
هو الذي  قليم  التحادي اذا حدث صراع بين القانون التحادي والقانون االقليمي فان قانون ا
هو الحال في المادة)  ؟ هل هذا يؤدي الى انشاء سلطة قضائية  2 /121يطبق؟ كما  ( من الدستور
مزدوجة في العراق؟   
يك اي اضافة او تعليق او تقديم اي قضية يرجى القيام به. واخيرا اذا كان لد   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
